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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Is a union's agreement, as part of a collective bargaining
agreement that requires bargaining unit members to submit
statutory rights disputes to binding arbitration, enforceable?

II.

Should disparate impact liability be recognized under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994),
and, if so, has Respondent succeeded in establishing business
necessity?
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OPINIONS BELOW
The findings of the arbitrator, the District Court for the District
of Wagner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth
Circuit, and the order granting certiorari to this Court are contained in
the record. (R. at 1-7, 9-17, 19-23, 25).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory provisions include 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)
and 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of the Proceedings
1.

Arbitrator

The American Union of College Professors brought an action on
behalf of Julie McCoy who was terminated from her teaching position
by her employer, Puerta Pacific College. (R. at 3). The Union alleged
that the college's salary structure violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994), because it had a disparate
impact on older professors. (R. at 3). The Union and the College were
unable to resolve the dispute through the grievance process outlined in
the collective bargaining agreement, and both parties agreed to have the
issue resolved by arbitration.
After extensive analysis of the statutory language of the ADEA,
Congressional intent, and current case law, the arbitrator determined that
the disparate impact theory of discrimination did not apply under the
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ADEA and rejected plaintiff s demands for reinstatement and backpay.
(R. at 3).
2.

District Court

Petitioner subsequently brought suit in U.S. district court after
the EEOC dismissed her ADEA claim and issued petitioner a "right-tosue" letter. (R. at 9). The College asserted that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter because petitioner agreed to submit her
claim to binding arbitration and received a full and fair hearing through
the arbitral process. (R. at 10). The court ruled that the petitioner was
not procedurally barred from bringing this action. (R. at 14). The court
also held that, while disparate impact was a viable legal theory under the
ADEA, petitioner's claim failed under the Act because the College
demonstrated that its profit plan was justified as a business necessity.
(R. at 15, 16). Petitioner appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. (R. at 19).
3.

Court of Appeals

On appeal to the Thirteenth Circuit, the court once again
dismissed petitioner's claim, finding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the dispute due to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. (R. at 20). As a result of its dismissal, the
Thirteenth Circuit found it unnecessary to consider the merits of the
petitioner's ADEA claim. Petitioner subsequently appeals once again to
this honorable Court.
B.

Statement of the Facts
Puerta Pacific College ("Puerta Pacific"), founded in 1925, is a
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large multi-campus institution located in the State of Wagner. (R. at 2).
In 1972, Puerta Pacific expanded by purchasing several smaller colleges
and community colleges in the area. (R. at 2). As part of this expansion,
Puerta Pacific opened its School of Criminal Justice in 1984. (R. at 2).
In 1989, Puerta Pacific was forced to re-examine its internal
structure which necessitated making some difficult business decisions
with regard to faculty and staff. (R. at 2). The problems were due, in
part, to a significant downturn in student applications and enrollment.
(R. at 2). In 1991, in an effort to combat this downward economic trend
and regain the stability that Puerta Pacific previously maintained, the
school discontinued several degree programs and laid off 250 members
of its faculty and staff. (R. at 2). The School of Criminal Justice
particularly suffered from these layoffs. (R. at 2). Due to the economic
uncertainty and fear of what was to come, a number of professors left to
find more secure employment. (R. at 3). Puerta Pacific has since found
it difficult to regain its stability, and with it an inability to attract new
professors. (R. at 3).
In January 1994, in an effort to reverse the fortunes of Puerta
Pacific and in an attempt to avoid further significant layoffs, the Board
of Trustees voted unanimously to institute an austerity plan, known as
the "Profit Plan." (R. at 2).. The Plan had two parts: Part One created
"Fund 2000," an endowment fund with a goal of raising 5 million dollars
by the year 2000; Part Two involved a salary structure that linked years
of experience to salaries paid to newly hired professors. (R. at 2).
Under the newly created salary structure, designed to reduce operating
costs, professors were to be hired at a point no higher than Step 2.1 (R.
at 2).
Petitioner, Julie McCoy, had been a guest lecturer at the School

At Step 2, a professor with a maximum of five years experience in teaching or
in law enforcementand holding only a bachelor's degree is paid no more than $28,000 per
year for the first year of employment.
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of Criminal Justice. (R. at 2). In 1995, petitioner inquired with the
President of Puerta Pacific, Sylvia Spelling, whether a teaching position
was available at the college. (R. at 2). At the time of petitioner's
inquiry, one position still remained open at the School of Criminal
Justice. (R. at 3). This position had been available since the beginning
of the 1995-96 academic year. (R. at 3).
Although petitioner interviewed for the position and was hired
to fill the vacancy, the search committee continued to interview
qualified applicants. (R. at 3). Because of the strength of petitioner's
qualifications and because of her many years of experience both in the
field and within the profession, petitionerwas hired at Step 7.2 (R. at 3).
This conflicted with the salary structure, requiring that no new professor
be hired at a point higher than Step 2. (R. at 3). Thus, in October 1995,
Puerta Pacific found and hired a candidate who was not only qualified
for the job, but who met the criteria under the salary structure. (R. at 3).
The search committee then discontinued its search and was forced to
terminate petitioner. (R. at 3). Petitioner's Union subsequently filed a
grievance on her behalf. (R. at 3).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit holding a lack of jurisdiction to
hear the underlying dispute. Furthermore, this Court should recognize
and enforce the collective bargaining agreement's mandatory, final and
binding provisions regarding all claims, including those brought under
the ADEA. The Federal Arbitration Act and its underlying policies,
which strongly encourage and promote arbitration proceedings, control
the resolution of this dispute. Thus, this Court should uphold the intent

I The starting salary at Step 7 is $53,000 per year.
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of the parties and bind them to their freely chosen and negotiated
agreement. Based upon the arbitrator's decision, which the parties
agreed would be final and binding, this Court should affirm the holding
that the courts lack jurisdiction. If this Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction, it should reject the petitioner's argument that a disparate
impact theory is cognizable under the ADEA. Alternatively, if such a
theory is found to be cognizable under the ADEA, this Court should
nevertheless dismiss petitioner's claim because Puerta Pacific's Profit
Plan was based upon business necessity. Congress implicitly rejected
the applicability of disparate impact theory under the ADEA when it
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and intentionally declined a
recognition of the theory. Moreover, the statutory language of the Civil
Rights Act provides for "reasonable factors other than age," thus
evincing a purposeful rejection of claims based upon disparate impact.
Finally, recognition of disparate impact under the ADEA would create
inherent conflict with other provisions within the Act. Thus, this Court
should reject petitioner's claim of disparate impact theory.
Alternatively, if disparate impact is recognized under the ADEA, this
Court should nonetheless dismiss petitioner's claim because Puerta
Pacific's Profit Plan was a legitimate business necessity.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE THIRTEENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION THAT THE COURTS LACK
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS MATTER
BECAUSE THE PETITIONER, THROUGH A
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENT,
AGREED TO SUBMIT ALL CONTRACTUAL AND
STATUTORY CLAIMS TO FINAL AND BINDING
ARBITRATION.
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The collective bargaining agreement at issue provided for a final
and binding resolution to this dispute. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear this matter and petitioner's claim should be dismissed. Article
21, Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement requires Puerta
Pacifica College ("Puerta Pacifica") to follow federal laws against
discrimination, including claims of alleged age discrimination. Article
47 of the Agreement provides the grievance procedures available,
including submitting statutory disputes to final and binding arbitration
pursuant to Sections 1 and 2. In Section 3 of Article 47, the agreement
provides that the decision of the arbitrator, in all disputes submitted to
arbitration, shall be "final and binding upon both parties as to all issues."
Thus, because the Petitioner's claim falls within the purview of this
Agreement, and because the Agreement provides that the arbitrator's
decision is final and binding, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
dispute and petitioner's claim should be dismissed.
It is well settled that in order to achieve the underlying goals and
policies of arbitration, the judiciary must recognize and respect the
finality of arbitration decisions. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). By agreeing
to submit a dispute to final and binding arbitration, parties can secure a
decisive resolution of their differences without the delay inherent in
litigation.
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v.
Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir.
1992). With this agreement comes an expectation that the procedures
and ultimate resolution will be binding upon the parties. McKee v.
Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981, 985 (5th Cir. 1995).
"Every presumption" favors the validity of the arbitrator's decision.
Richmond, 973 F.2d at 278 (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 344, 351 (1855)). Judicial review of an arbitration decision is
thus "among the narrowest known to the law." Union Pacific R.R. Co.
v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978). Thus, this Court should recognize
the binding and preclusive effect of the arbitrator's decision.
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This Court's decision in Gilmer and its progeny
provide the clearest guidance in resolving this
matter in both its underlying analysis and in its
application to the ADEA.

This Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), and its context within the ADEA controls the
resolution of this matter. In Gilmer, this Court held that a claim under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994)
("ADEA"), was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an
agreement between the employer and the employee. 500 U.S. at 23.
The analysis began in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("FAA") and its "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements." Id. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The
significance of the FAA and its policies underlying the Gilmer decision
should not be overlooked because the decision in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and numerous subsequent cases relying
upon it, were not considered in light of the FAA and its commands.
Some scholars and commentators have suggested that had this Court
decided Gardner-Denver within the context of the FAA, that decision
may have produced a different result. See, e.g., R. Bales, A New
Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and the
Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L.
REv. 1863, 1887 (1994).
This Court dismissed the argument that statutory claims cannot
or should not be subject to mandatory arbitration by stating that "it is by
now clear" that statutory claims may be subject to mandatory arbitration
agreements enforceable under the FAA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. In
addition, this Court denounced many of the arguments accepted in
Gardener-Denvei namely a fundamental mistrust of arbitration and the
view that it does not provide adequate protection of statutory claims. Id.
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at 28-32. Finally, though it must be noted that the Gilmer decision did
not arise in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, the Court
did state that the "[m]ere inequality of bargaining power.., is not a
sufficient reason" to hold that arbitration agreements should not be
enforceable. Id. at 33.
The petitioner in Gilmer argued that this Court's prior decision
in Gardner-DenverCo. controlled the resolution of that dispute. Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 33. In response, this Court stated explicitly that the reliance
upon Gardner-Denver and its progeny was "misplaced," and
distinguished its line of reasoning on three grounds: (1) unlike Gilmer,
the cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate statutory claims; (2) Gardner-Denverwas not decided under
the rationale of the FAA; and (3) the absence of a collective bargaining
context found in Gardner-Denver. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
In addition to the absence of a provision mandating the
arbitration of statutory claims, Gardner-Denver can further be
distinguished because the decision rested upon the language, legislative
history and purpose of Title VII. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 48-49.
Unlike the concerns raised by the Gardner-Denver Court in Title VII
claims, this Court in Gilmer noted that nothing in the ADEA or its
underlying policies would be hindered by enforcing mandatory
arbitration. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-32. Finally, it must be noted that
although the Gardner-Denver Court expressed concerns about
individuals in the collective bargaining context in which the case arose,
that discussion was limited to a footnote within the twenty-two page
opinion. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
Although there are numerous distinguishing factors between the
Gilmer line of reasoning and that of Gardner-Denver, Gilmer provides
this Court with the most well-reasoned and persuasive approach to the
resolution of this dispute. Thus, a further examination of Gilmer and its
progeny is necessary. Based upon this examination, it is clear that this
claim is not properly before this Court.
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The Federal Arbitration Act applies to
collective bargaining agreements, thus
the Act's underlying policies and
commands should be applied.

The scope of the FAA extends to collective bargaining
agreements. Thus the policy favoring arbitration proceedings compels
courts to respect the finality provisions contained within them. Subject
to a "very limited judicial review," employees and their employers
operating under a collective bargaining agreement are "bound by the
result according to the finality provisions of the agreement."
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-64
(1983). This Court has never addressed the issue whether the FAA
should apply to collective bargaining agreements.
In United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., however, the following
language appears in a footnote:
The Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of
employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce,' . . . but the federal courts have
often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration
cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act 1947 .
empowers federal courts to fashion rules of federal
common law to govern '[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization under the
federal labor laws.'
484 U.S. 29, 41 n.9 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
Several courts have referred to the above language erroneously
as authority for the proposition that collective bargaining agreements are
excluded from the scope of the FAA. See, e.g., Bacashihua v. United
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States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding
that collective bargaining agreements are excluded based upon the
guidance of Misco); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 n.*
(E.D. Mo. 1993) (stating in a footnote that based upon Misco,
"Collective bargaining agreements are agreed to be excluded from the
scope of the FAA under section 1."). This interpretation, however, is
tenuous at best. See, e.g., Scott V. Rozmus, Resolving Statutory Claims
Under ERISA: An Analysis of Whether Courts May Permit or Require
Litigants to Use Nonjudicial Fora to Resolve Claims Brought Under §
502(A)(3), 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1027, 1035 n.57 (1994) (stating that
Misco "seemingly resolved the dispute"); Amanda G. Dealy,
Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace: Reconciling
Gilmer, Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37
B.C. L. REv. 479, 482 n.29 (1996) (stating that although this Court has
never explicitly addressed the issue, Misco "has implied" the resolution
of the issue).
Numerous circuits support the proposition that collective
bargaining agreements constitute employment contracts within the
purview of the FAA. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that collective bargaining agreements constitute
employment contracts under the FAA); United Food and Commercial
Workers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1989)
(same); Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (same). Although the above
courts do agree there is little meaningful distinction between
employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements, the courts
mistakenly take the argument a step further and assume that because
these agreements are considered contracts of employment, they are thus
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necessarily excluded from the FAA under Section 1.3 A reasoned
discussion to support this leap in logic to extend the "contract of
employment" exclusion to collective bargaining agreements, however,
is notably missing.
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432 (1996), the Fourth Circuit
upheld the mandatory and binding provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. Though Austin was not decided under the guidance of the
FAA, the court did rely upon the "well-recognized policy" of federal
labor law favoring arbitration. Id. at 879. As in Gilmer, the court did
not find a Congressional intent to preclude arbitration of the particular
statutory rights at issue, nor did the court find troublesome that the rights
of an individual were being protected under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 881-82, 885. Moreover, similar to Gilmer
and the case at bar, and unlike Gardner-Denver, the collective
bargaining agreement included within its provisions binding arbitration
of specific statutory rights. Id.at 885. Thus, although the issue of
jurisdictional preclusion was not before the court, it does provide this
Court with guidance in that the collective bargaining agreement was
upheld even without the underlying policy considerations of the FAA
applicable to this case. See also Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr.. Inc.,
930 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (upholding a collective bargaining
agreement providing for binding arbitration of statutory rights and
rejecting the argument that Gardner-Denvergoverned the dispute). Thus,
this Court should conclude that the FAA is applicable and should
disregard the erroneous distinction some courts have made between
collective bargaining agreements and other contracts of employment
within the purview of the FAA.

'Fora further discussionof the ExclusionaryClause of Section I of the FAA, see
Part B.
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Collective bargaining in the
employment context provides
an effective and powerful voice
to individual employees.

Individual rights, secured under both contract and statutes, are
protected by Union leaders and negotiators operating within the context
of collective bargaining agreements. "National labor policy has been
built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization," employees gain "the most effective
means" to exercise their rights at the bargaining table. NLRB v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). "The majority-rule
concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor
policy." Id. (citations omitted). Although a union represents employees
as a group, the individual employees within that group are the
beneficiaries of the "collective action." Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp.,
58 F.3d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1995). Thus, the argument that individual
rights will be subsumed and ignored within the collective bargaining
context is unfounded and patently untrue.
b.

Unions owe to each individual
member a fiduciary duty of fair
representationthus the needs of
individuals are protected.

Both Congress and the courts ensure that individual rights will
be protected by imposing uniform standards of conduct by which unions
are bound. Specifically, a bargaining agent has the "responsibility and
duty of fair representation... subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976) (citations omitted). This
duty of fair representation is similar to the relationship between
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fiduciaries and beneficiaries. Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l v. O'Neill, 499
U.S. 65, 74 (1991). The union is "responsible to, and owes complete
loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents." Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). Through established grievance
procedures agreed to by the parties and negotiated in good faith, "both
sides are assured that similar complaints will be treated consistently."
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are
either "arbitrary, discriminatory,or in bad faith." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
This rule applies to all union activity, including contract negotiations.
Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 67. This doctrine of fair representation is an
"important check on the arbitrary exercise of union power, but it is a
purposefully limited check, for a 'wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it
represents."' United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 374
(1990). The actions of a union will be considered arbitrary only if the
actions are "so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness'

. . .

as to be

irrational." Id. (citations omitted).
Any substantive examination of a union's performance must be
"highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need
for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities." Air
Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 78. In order to withstand challenges on the
grounds of legally insufficiency, the plaintiff must be able to show the
court record evidence supporting arbitrary action, discrimination or bad
faith. Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 32 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir.
1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
(1986)). In this case, there is no indication nor accusation of arbitrary
action, discrimination or bad faith. Thus, this Court should defer to the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and uphold its final
and binding effects.

998

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
2.

[Vol. XIII

The collective bargaining agreement
provided for mandatory and final
arbitration of statutory rights.

The scope of the collective bargaining agreement at issue
included the resolution of ADEA claims, thus the parties are bound by
the arbitrator's resolution of this dispute. Not all controversiesthat may
be classified as violations of both contractual and statutory rights are
necessarily suitable for arbitration. "There is no reason to distort the
process of contract interpretation, however, in order to ferret out the
inappropriate." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum." Id. at 628. When a party raises claims founded upon
statutory rights, the presumption in favor of arbitrability remains.
Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 797 (1 0th Cir. 1995).
It must be noted that Gardner-Denver and many of the cases that rely
upon its reasoning involve a factual context in which the collective
bargaining agreement at issue did not contain a provision mandating the
arbitration of statutory rights. Thus, because the collective bargaining
agreement in the case at bar contained such a provision, Gardner-Denver
and its progeny are inapplicable.
In addition to the agreement mandating the arbitration of ADEA
claims, this Court found in Gilmer that nothing within the ADEA or its
legislative history suggests an intention to preclude binding arbitration
of the rights secured under the Act. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-29. A court
must assume that if the legislative intent underlying a statute were a
protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, "that intention
will be deducible from text or legislative history." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S.
at 628. "Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held
to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver
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of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Id. No such
intention to preclude exists here. Thus, pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement and its incorporation of statutory claims based
upon the ADEA, this dispute is governed by the mandatory, binding and
final disposition of the arbitrator.

B.

Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act is a
narrow provision that clearly was not meant to
preclude all employment contracts.

The FAA excludes certain types of employment contracts, but
that exclusion does not extend to collective bargaining agreements such
as the one at issue here. Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." Whether Section 1 of the FAA is to be construed
to exclude all employment contracts was an issue that in 1991 this Court
decided to "leave for another day." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. That
day is now here. Numerous circuit courts have addressed this issue and
the overwhelming majority have determined that Section 1 is to be
narrowly construed, thus making the FAA applicable to employment
contracts with a few exceptions. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec.
Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953) (concluding
that the exclusions in Section 1 are limited to employees engaged in the
transportation industries or engaged in the actual movement of goods in
interstate commerce); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir.
1971) (same); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d
1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery
Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (same); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v:
Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Section 1
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should be "narrowly construed to apply to employment contracts of
seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers actually
engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same
way that seamen and railroad workers are");
Rojas v. TK
Communications. Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (determining
that Section 1 should be narrowly construed). If the underlying intent
of Congress were to exclude all employment contracts from the
coverage of the FAA, "it could simply have said 'employment contracts'
and left it at that." DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947,
953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Rojas, 87 F.3d at 748 (reasoning that
Congress could have, but did not, include "but nothing herein contained
shall apply to any contracts of employment."). The Rojas court also
referred to a lower court that stated bluntly, "[i]t is quite impossible to
apply a broad meaning to the term 'commerce' in Section 1 and not rob
the rest of the exclusion clause of all significance." Rojlas, 87 F.3d at
748 (quoting Albert v. National Cash Register Co., 874 F. Supp. 1324,
1327 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Interpretingthe exclusionaryclause narrowly "comports with the
actual language of the statute and the apparent intent" of Congress.
Asplundh Tree Expert, 71 F.3d at 601. Moreover, as the Asplundh court
reasoned, the phrase 'workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce'
is "illustrated by the context in which it is used, particularly the two
specific examples given, seamen and railroad employees, those being
two classes of employees engaged in the movement of goods in
commerce." Id. In addition to the circuit court decisions above, the
Asplundh Court noted the numerous district courts that follow the
narrow interpretation of Section 1. See Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 600
(discussing six district court decisions that comport with the discussion
above). Such a narrow reading is consistent with the underlying purpose
of the FAA, namely to favor arbitration. Moreover, the legislative
history of the FAA suggests that the exclusion may have arisen from
some "relatively narrow concerns over certain classes of workers."
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DiCrisci, 807 F. Supp. at 953. Thus, Section 1 should not be read to
exclude collective bargaining agreements from the scope of the FAA.
Based upon the arguments set forth above, this Court should
follow the direction of the courts below and hold that collective
bargaining agreements should be construed under the guidance of the
FAA. This Court should further follow the holdings of the courts below
and interpret the exclusionary clause of Section 1 as a narrow provision
applicable to a select few employment contracts. Having made these
determinations, this Court need only to look to the FAA and uphold the
policy considerations it was designed to protect.

C.

The FAA codifies a federal labor policy that
strongly encourages and promotes arbitration,
thus the underlying intent of the FAA is
protected only by upholding the arbitration
decision that these parties agreed would be final
and binding.

The FAA mandates that collective bargaining agreements
containing mandatory and binding arbitration provisions be upheld
according to their terms. This Court's decision should "rest upon a
reluctance to undercut a process whose importance to labor-management
relations has been reaffirmed repeatedly by Congress and the Courts."
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation
Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992). The
FAA reversed "centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements"
and placed "arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (.1974)
(citations omitted). The FAA reflects a "legislative recognition of the
desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of
litigation." Id. at 511. The use of arbitral proceedings has grown
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exponentially in recent years, in part because it eases the burdens on
already crowded court dockets. Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer
Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of Mandatory
Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse
the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391, 392 (1996).
Questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a "healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). This presumption in favor of arbitrability
remains in the context of claims based upon statutory rights. Id. The
purpose of the FAA is not to require that all claims be arbitrated, but
merely to ensure enforcement of negotiated arbitration agreements
according to their terms. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219 (1985). Followingthe general rules of contract interpretation,
the "parties intentions control, but those intentions are generously
construed as to issues of arbitrability." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
Parties are free to structure an arbitration agreement to satisfy their
particular needs, and just as "they may limit by contract the issues which
they will arbitrate ... so too may they specify by contract the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted." Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1995) (citations
omitted).
Federal policy favoring arbitration agreements prevents a party
from ignoring the agreement to arbitrate and simply resorting to the
courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984). "Congress
intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations,
unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive
solution of their differences." Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l v. O'Neill, 499
U.S. 65, 74 (1991) (citing Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S.
212, 219 (1979)). Based upon these widely held policy beliefs, the
collective bargaining agreement here, which included provisions that its
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mandatory arbitration procedures would be final and binding, should be
viewed by this Court as having stripped the judiciary of jurisdiction.
Thus, this claim should be dismissed even before reaching the merits of
the underlying ADEA claim.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REJECT THE
APPLICATION OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
TO CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE ADEA; BUT
IF THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES THAT
THIS THEORY APPLIES TO CLAIMS BROUGHT
UNDER THE ADEA, THE COURT SHOULD FIND
FOR PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE BECAUSE THE
COLLEGE HAS SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A
BUSINESS NECESSITY.

This Court should reject the application of disparate impact
theory to claims brought under the ADEA. Congress enacted the ADEA
for three primary purposes: to promote the employment of older persons
based on ability rather than on age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; and to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment. Evan Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes:
Why Disparate Impact Theory Should not Apply to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C.L. REv. 267, 271-72 (1995).
The goal of the ADEA is to shift the focus from age and to prohibit
employers from using age as a factor in employment decisions.
Congress' intent, however, in enacting the ADEA was not to prohibit all
considerations of age and age-related criteria. Rather, the three
references to "arbitrary age discrimination" in the text of the ADEA
evinces that Congress only intended to prohibit this form of
discrimination.
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The language of the ADEA makes clear that claims based on
disparate treatment are available under the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (noting that disparate treatment
"captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the
ADEA"). Disparate treatment occurs when "[an] employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion [or other protected characteristics.]." Id. In order to be
successful on a disparate treatment claim, proof of discriminatory
motive is critical. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076
(7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995) (citing International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
While the language of the Act clearly permits an employee to recover
under this theory, the absence of any language supporting disparate
impact precludes petitioner's claim under the ADEA.
Unlike disparate treatment claims where an employee is actually
treated differently, disparate impact claims involve a much more subtle
practice. Disparate impact refers to a situation where a facially neutral
employmentpolicy or practice falls more harshly on a class of workers
protected by the statute and cannot be justified by business necessity.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076. This Court developed the
disparate impact analysis in the context of Title VII race discrimination
cases and has used this theory solely in that context. See Hazen Paper
Co., 507 U.S. at 617 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
nothing in the Court's opinion should be read to incorporate disparate
impact theory to claims brought under the ADEA).
Some courts have assumed that disparate impact doctrine applies
under the ADEA without any formal analysis of the issue. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Local 350. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.
1993); Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239,
1244-45 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo,
922 F.2d 766 (11 th Cir. 1991); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,
702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032
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(2d Cir. 1980); Scwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979);
Laugesenv. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). However, the
application of disparate impact theory in the context of cases arising
under the ADEA is misguided. First, these aforementioned cases were
all decided prior to this Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).4 Most of these decisions were based on
the assumption that the ADEA parallels Title VII. However, the
decision of this Court in Hazen Paper renders this assumption
unwarranted. Id. at 612. Thus, these decisions do not offer any
persuasive authority for this Court. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that Congress ever intended this theory to be available to plaintiffs
bringing suits under the ADEA. Thus, this Court should hold that
disparate impact theory is not a viable legal theory under the ADEA.
Alternatively, if this Court finds that disparate impact theory applies
under the ADEA, petitioner's claim should nevertheless be dismissed
because the College has successfully established a business necessity for
its profit plan.
A.

The failure of Congress to codify the principle
of disparate impact theory in the 1991
amendment to the Civil Rights Act constitutes
an implied rejection of the doctrine's
applicability to claims under the ADEA.

Congress implicitly rejected the applicability of disparate impact
theory to claims under the ADEA when it amended the Civil Rights Act
to specifically provide for disparate impact claims under Title VII and

4 Since the decision in Hazen Paper, only one panel of the Eighth Circuit has
assumed, again without analysis, that disparate impact theory applies to claims under the
ADEA. See Houghton v. Sipco. Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994).
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did not make similar revisions to the ADEA. Included among the 1991
amendments were changes both to Title VII and to the ADEA. The
purpose of the amendment was twofold: first, it codified the concept of
business necessity, enunciated by this Court in such decisions as Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1974). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994). Second, Congress explicitly stated that statutory
authority existed for disparate impact claims to be brought under Title
VII, yet did not make any such acknowledgment under the ADEA. See
id. However, no amendment in the 1991 Civil Rights Act recognized
the authority for disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Many courts
have reasoned that if Congress intended that disparate impact be a viable
theory under the ADEA, it would have specifically acknowledged such
claims in the 1991 amendment.
Congress' amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly
lists the types of discrimination cases where disparate impact is
recognized as a viable theory of employment discrimination. Under the
amendment, an unlawful employment practice can be based on disparate
impact only if the employment practice causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin d.. Congress'
failure to include the applicability of disparate impact theory to cases
arising under the ADEA evinces that Congress explicitly rejected the
propriety of the theory to claims arising under the ADEA. See Martincic
v. Urban RedevelopmentAuth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1078-79-(W.D. Pa.
1994).
B.

The Statutory defense of 'reasonable factors
other than age'. available to an employer under
the ADEA. evinces that Congress did not intend
to allow disparate impact claims under the Act.

The specific statutory defense of 'reasonable factors other than
age' in the ADEA shows conclusively that Congress did not intend for
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disparate impact theory to be a method of recovery under the Act.
Under the ADEA, an employer can defend against an age discrimination
action on the ground that it distinguished between the employees on
"reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994). This
section of the statute allows employers to make employment decisions
which affect age, so long as the decisions are motivated by factors other
than age. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., a discharged employee
brought suit claiming employment discrimination. 13 F.3d 1120, 1126
(7th Cir. 1994). In holding that the employer had not discriminated
against the employee, the court stated that even if the employer fired the
employee only to reduce salary costs, it would not be considered age
discrimination. Id. at 1126. Citing this Court's holding in Hazen Paper,
the Seventh Circuit observed, "there is no disparate treatment under the
ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other
than the employee's age." Id.
at 1125. The court continued: "[b]ecause
age and [compensation levels] are analytically distinct, an employer can
take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to
say that a decision based on ...compensation levels is necessarily 'age
based."' Id. at 1126.
The basis for a disparate impact claim is that a facially-neutral
policy negatively affects older workers, even if the decision is motivated
by factors other than age. However, the existence of a "reasonable
factors other than age" defense conflicts with the theory that disparate
impact claims are available under the ADEA.
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The underlying purpose for recognizing
disparate impact theory is inapplicable in the
context of the ADEA.

The underlying rationale for disparate impact claims is that there
are some policies or practices which, while facially neutral, nonetheless
perpetuate discrimination against a protected class. Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). This rationale, however, is
inapplicable in the context of the ADEA. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
this Court held that an employer's policy or practice cannot be
maintained if it operates to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
practices. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1974). In finding disparate impact
applicable to claims arising under Title VII, this Court did not rely on
any specific statutory language, but on policies underlying the Statute.
DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1996). This policy, however, is not easily
transplanted into the context of the ADEA.
The ADEA protects against inaccurate stereotyping of the
elderly. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610. However, as the Seventh Circuit
observed, "the ADEA requiresthe employer to ignore an employee'sage
...it does not specify further characteristics that an employer must
ignore." EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, when an employer's decision is motivated by factors other than
age, the negative stereotypingdisappears. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611.
Unlike race discrimination, where there is no correlation
between race and ability, Congress recognized there is a correlation
between age and ability. Id. at 612. Accordingly, Congress limited the
statutory coverage of the ADEA to persons under the age of seventy and
provided statutory defenses to the employer. In contrast, Title VII
contains no limitation in the statutory coverage nor is an employer given
any statutory defenses similar to the bona fide occupational qualification
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defense.
Furthermore, the correlation between age and ability cannot be
traced to a history of past discrimination against these particular
individuals who were previously younger and possibly the beneficiaries
of any age discrimination. Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination
and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837, 843 (1982).
The concerns that were present in Griggs, that the history of past
educational discriminationwas being used to perpetuate discrimination
in the area of employment, are simply not present in the context of
disparate impact based on age. Id. at 844.
This Court has expressly declined to equate the degree of past
discrimination against older workers with the degree of discrimination
against African-Americans. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgja, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding that Massachusetts statute
establishing mandatory retirement at the age of fifty did not amount to
discrimination against a suspect class for the purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In Massachusetts
Board of Retirement, this Court observed,
[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a history of purposeful
unequal treatment or been subjected to unique disabilitieson the
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities.
Id. at 313. Thus, while recognizing that the level of discrimination
against the elderly was not the same as that against African-Americans,
this Court also recognized that age is often a relevant indicator of job
performance.
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Disparate impact should not apply to the ADEA
because of the differences between the ADEA
and Title VII.

Disparate impact is not a viable legal theory under the ADEA
because of fundamental differences between the ADEA and Title VII.
This Court developed the disparate impact theory to deal with
employment discrimination problems facing protected classes under
Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1974). Age is only
afforded protection under the ADEA; it is not a protected class under
Title VII. Thus, the ADEA has its own language, history and goals that
are distinct from Title VII, and must be construed in light of the Act's
unique differences.
While the language and the provisions of the ADEA are largely
identical to that of Title VII, such common similarities should not be
interpreted to mean that statutes parallel each other in every aspect. The
evidence of such an error is readily visible. In Geller v. Markham, the
Second Circuit relied on this Court's precedent in Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575 (1978), to hold that the principle of disparate impact applies to
claims under the ADEA. 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). The Court in Lorillard, however, made
clear that while "important similarities" between the two statutes exist,
there were "significant differences" as well. 434 U.S. at 584.
Significant among these differences is the fact that plaintiffs in ADEA
claims have a right to a jury trial. Id. at 585. In contrast, plaintiffs in a
Title VII action did not receive the right to a jury trial until the 1991
amendmentto the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(c) (1994). Thus,
while both Title VII and the ADEA attempt to remedy discrimination
against a protected class, fundamental procedural differences exist
between the statutes.
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Construing the ADEA to authorize
disparate impact claims is an improper
interpretation of the Act and conflicts
with other sections of the Statute.

The justification upon which courts and scholars rely to
incorporate disparate impact theory in claims underthe ADEA is that the
language of the Act could be read to allow such an interpretation. Pontz,
at 292. However, such a reading of the statute is both inconsistent with
other sections of the ADEA and is also grammatically incorrect.
The ADEA states that it shall be unlawful for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994). One interpretation of
this section is that the clause "because of such individual's age" modifies
the verb "adversely affects." Under such an interpretation, an employer
is prohibited from engaging in any practice which affects an employee
because of his age. Thus, facially neutral policies which do not
necessarily treat an employee differently, but which nonetheless have an
affect or impact on the employee, violate the ADEA.
The alternative reading of the section is that the clause "because
of age" modifies the verb clause "to limit, segregate or classify." Under
this interpretation, the statute proscribes certain treatment of an
employee because of his age. Thus, policies or practices which may
adversely affect employees, but which do not limit, segregate or classify
employees because of their age, do not violate the Act. Courts have
found this latter interpretation both grammatically correct and consistent
with other sections of the ADEA. DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 733 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306
(1996).
First, the comma that precedes the clause "because of age"
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suggests that Congress intended the provision to modify the prohibited
conduct, namely, limiting, segregating or classifying employees. .Kro,
at 843 n.27. Any other interpretation renders the comma unnecessary.
As the Tenth Circuit in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc. observed, "[i]t
would be a stretch to read the phrase 'because of such individual's age'
to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted
because of employment decisions that were made for reasons other than
age." 79 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500
(1996).
Second, the construction of this section is identical to the
preceding section of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994). Under
the preceding, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's
age." Id. Under this section, the clause "because of such individual's
age" can modify only the prohibited conduct. Thus, only conduct which
treats employees differently because of age is prohibited under the Act.
The similarity in the wording between the two sections suggests that
Congress intended to proscribe only disparate treatment.

2.

Construing the ADEA to incorporate
disparate impact claims would deny the
class of individuals most likely to
benefit and is inconsistentwith a similar
section of Title VII.

Congress' express limitation that the ADEA apply solely to
employees and not to job applicants further evinces Congress' intent to
authorize only disparate treatment. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994).
The Act prohibits an employer from limiting, segregating, or classifying
his employees because of the individual's age. Id. Job applicants,
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however, are the most common claimants under disparate impact
doctrine. Krp, at 843. Thus, it is inconceivable that Congress intended
disparate impact to apply to claims under the ADEA while at the same
time, exclude the group of people most likely to benefit from such
claims. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995) (noting that the
exclusion of job applicants from subsection (2) is "noteworthy.").
The origins of the ADEA provide further evidence that Congress
did not intend for disparate impact claims to be available under the
ADEA. The language of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994) is drawn from a
similar section in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994). This
section, however, unlike its counterpart in the ADEA, prohibits an
employer from limiting, segregating or classifying either employees or
applicants because of race, religion, sex or national origin. Id. The
legislative history of this section suggests that Congress did not intend
to authorize disparate impact claims under Title VII. Krop, at 844.
Thus, if the section in Title VII were not intended to authorize such
claims, then the parallel provision in the ADEA should not be read to
authorize such claims.

E.

Alternatively, if the Supreme Court determines
that disparate impact applies to claims brought
under the ADEA, the Court should still dismiss
petitioner's claim because the College
established a Business Necessity for its Profit
Plan.

The College's business plan is clearly justified as a business
necessity which is vital to Puerta Pacific's continued success and future
existence. Business necessity is intended to reflect the concepts
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
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424, 431 (1971). These concepts recognize that an employer's practice,
even though it may have a disparate impact upon older workers, may
nevertheless be justified by business necessity or legitimate business
considerations. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. It is not necessary that the
challenged employment practice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the
employer's business in order to qualify as a legitimate business interest.
Abbott v. Federal Forge. Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 1990).
Rather, when considering the employer's justification, "the dispositive
issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer." MacPherson v.
University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991).
Courts have accorded employers wide latitude in determining
business practices, finding that the ADEA "was not intended as a vehicle
for judicial review of business decisions' Ackerman v. Diamond
Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Kephart v.
Institute of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980)). "The
ADEA does not authorize the courts to judge the wisdom of a
corporation's business decisions." Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964
F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Parcinski v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983)). These findings
all mirror the Supreme Court's statement that "courts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless
mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it." Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
In accordance with the above, courts have held that minimizing
the cost of labor constitutes a legitimate business consideration. Abbott,
912 F.2d at 875. In addition, firing an employee solely to reduce salary
costs does not constitute age discrimination. Anderson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994). Likewise,
reductions in force and reorganizations of staff are legitimate
nondiscriminatoryreasons for employment related decisions. Parcinski,
673 F.2d at 36. Finally, consolidations resulting in termination of
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employees, whatever their age, are "clearly a business decision with
which we can have no legitimate concern." Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943
(1982).
In MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, the court held that
business necessity justified the university's need to pay market rates to
attract and to hire good faculty members, despite a disparate impact on
older professors who were not similarly compensated. 922 F.2d 766,
772 (11 th Cir. 1991). In finding for the university,the court specifically
advised that "courts are generally less competent than employers to
restructure business practices.., the judiciary should proceed with care
before mandating that an employer must adopt . . . an alternative
employment practice." Id. at 773. Similarly, in Wooden v. Board of
Educ., the court refused to question the school board's policy of offering
greater compensation to faculty with recent teaching experience than
professors with more than ten years teaching experience. 931 F.2d 376,
379-380 (6th Cir. 1991). In deferringto the school'sjudgment, the court
stated, "[w]ithout evidence that the Board's reason is unsound,
unreasonable, or invalid, we are not in a position to second-guess the
Board's reasoning." Id. at 380. In the case at bar, the College's profit
plan constitutes a business necessity which is essential to the economic
survival of the College. The plan has enabled Puerta Pacific to avoid
significant future layoffs, to manage salary costs, and to attract and hire
new, experienced professors. These business considerations are not only
best left to the College's discretion, without judicial intervention, but
they also clearly constitute vital measures instituted to ensure the
College's continued success and future existence.
In 1991, Puerta Pacific was forced to permanently close several
campuses and to lay off over 250 personnel. The College continues to
suffer from the effects of the layoffs, as evidenced by its inability to
attract professors to teach classes at the School of Criminal Justice. The
profit plan enables Puerta Pacific to ensure job security to potential
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professors by better managing salaries paid to new professors and by
minimizing labor costs to secure the College's financial stability.
In addition to the above, the business necessity of the profit plan
is further evidenced by its ability to offer financial stability to the
College, to better manage the hiring of new faculty, and to offer more
and better academic programs to its students. As a result of the
inception of the profit plan in 1991, the College has been able to
reinstate a degree program in art history, to hire ten new assistant
professors, and to offer five new courses at the School of Criminal
Justice. These business decisions have all helped to ensure the financial
success and future existence of the College.
Faced with the prospect of future campus closures if labor costs
are not adequately controlled and if the College is unable to attract a
sufficient number of new faculty and students, the College has
demonstrated a business necessity for its profit plan which clearly
outweighs any alleged discriminatory impact upon older faculty
members.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Puerta Pacific respectfilly
requests that this Court find for the respondent on the issues of
jurisdiction and disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
Respectfully submitted,
CarolNewman
David Popham
Jeremy Sitcoff
The John MarshallLaw School

